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     The tragedy of Pak Moon Dam      

Bangkok Post, Perspective, October 1, 2000
DAM REPORT: An authoritative new report about Thailand's most controversial dam projectconfirms what local villagers have known all along-it's simply a flop

Last June, fierce protests at Parliament by villagers affected by the Pak Moon Dam in Ubon Ratchathani led to an independent government review of the project. The following month, the government agreed to open all the dam spillways for four months a year to allow for environmental recovery, fish migration and spawning.

Meanwhile, the World Commission on Dams, established by the World Conservation Union and the World Bank, has just completed the first independent analysis of the dam. Edited excerpts follow.


PREDICTED VERSUS ACTUAL BENEFITS, COSTS, AND IMPACTS

Project cost

In May 1989, the Cabinet approved a budget of 3.88 billion baht (US$ 155.2 million) for the project. In 1991, the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) approved a modified project cost of 6.6 billion baht (US$ 264 million). The final cost tally by EGAT in 1999 was 6.507 billion baht (US$ 260 million).

In nominal terms, the project cost increased by 68% from the original estimates between 1989-99. Not including taxes and interest during construction, the cost overruns in nominal terms are 91% over original estimates in 1988. However, in real terms, (calculated at constant 1998 prices) the actual total project cost did not differ significantly from the original estimate in 1988.

Compensation and Resettlement costs increased from 231.55 million baht (US$ 9.26 million) in EGAT's 1988 estimate to an actual expenditure of 1,113.1 million baht (US$ 44.24 million) in 1999. In real terms, resettlement costs increased by 182%. Compensation for loss in fisheries, which was unanticipated in the original estimate, accounted for 395.6 million baht by April 1999 (US$ 15.8 million).

Benefits - Hydropower

Pak Moon dam is located at the end of a large watershed where rainfall and run- off vary considerably between dry and wet seasons. During wet months, Pak Moon can turbine the daily inflow to serve the four hour peak demand and can generate power in off-peak hours with surplus water available. However, during the dry months the plant cannot produce its full rated capacity for the 4 hour peak demand due to insufficient water.

The output of the plant depends on the water level in the reservoir and the tailwater level. The dam's power production peaks in the wet season when it is least needed in the power system and is lowest in the dry season when it is most needed. When the water levels in the Mekong river are very high, the power plant will be shutdown for lack of generating head. The operation records from the commissioning of the plant in 1994 indicate that Pak Moon's average annual output has been 290 GWh. In Egat's presentation to the Cabinet and World Bank documents, Pak Moon featured as a 136 MW run of the river project to serve peak needs. However, following the rules based on the daily power output data between 1995-99, Pak Moon can use only 15% of its capacity as reliable 4 hour peak capacity.

The actual dependable capacity of the dam project calculated from daily power output between 1995-98, assuming that all available power gets assigned to a four hour peak demand period, is only 20.81 MW. However, the value adopted by Egat and sanctioned by the World Bank is much higher at 150 MW.

Since 1993, responding to Egat's successful Demand Side Management (DSM) programme, the sharp four hour demand peak has been replaced by a flatter 13 hour plateau. During the dry season Pak Moon can supply power over this extended period at further reduced capacity.

The actual operation of the dam is often different from what was assumed in the planning studies. This type of operation may be beneficial from an ancillary services point of view (such as frequency and voltage regulation, Var control etc.), but the energy benefits will be less than planned.

Recalculating the project's equalising discount rate assuming that one would need one 21 MW gas turbine to provide the dependable capacity of a 20.8 MW hydro plant, the current report reaches a value of 7.88% which is below the shadow cost of capital in Thailand. When the benefits of the ancillary electricity net support of the dam and the green house gasses reduction benefit of the dam were included in the evaluation of the dam, these benefits were not sufficient to make the project economically justifiable.

Benefits - Irrigation

The Pak Moon project was presented for review to the NESDB in 1988 and to the Cabinet in 1989 as a multi-purpose development project. In the 1991 World Bank SAR for the Third Power Project, besides hydropower and irrigation, fisheries appeared as a major benefit from the project. Irrigation benefits were not included in the economic analysis of the project by the World Bank in its 1991 Staff Appraisal Report. The irrigation benefits of a run of the river project were doubtful and this was known at the time the irrigation benefits were quantified in Egat's project document.

Benefits-Fishery

About 7% of the project benefits were attributed to fisheries in Egat's 1988 Project documents. The 1981 Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) predicted that fish production from the reservoir would increase considerably, though some fish species may be affected by the blockage of river flows by the dam. The fish yield expected from the 60 square km Pak Moon reservoir was 100 kg/ha/year without fish stocking and 220 kg/ha/year with the fish-stocking programme. However, run of the river reservoirs cannot sustain such high yields, as they do not provide the appropriate habitat for pelagic fish species. In Thailand, even storage reservoirs that perform better under fish stocking programmes have a fish yield of about 19 to 38 kg/ha/year. The predicted fish yield from the dam head pond was too high. A more realistic estimate would have been around 10 kg/ha/year. There has been no evidence to indicate that the fish productivity of Pak Moon reservoir has reached anywhere near the anticipated 100 kilogrammes per year.

After completion of Pak Mun, the lower Moon River experienced a decline in fishing yields with an estimated value of US$1.4 million per annum. In addition to this decline in fish species upstream led to the closure of 70 Tum Pla Yon traps. The value of the annual catch from these traps is calculated at US$212,000.

IMPACTS

The 1982-83 Environmental Planning Survey predicted 241 households would be displaced by the project. The actual number of households displaced by Pak Moon was 1,700. Unpredicted by the EIA, a large number of households were adversely affected due to declining fishing yields. Until March 2000, 6,202 households were compensated for loss in fisheries during the three year construction period. Compensation for the permanent loss of fisheries has not been given.

UnEXPECTED IMPACTS

Impact on Fish Migration & Fish diversity

Of the 265 fish species recorded in the Moon-Chi watershed before 1994, 77 species are migratory and 35 species are dependent on rapids for their habitat. The latest survey after the construction of the dam recorded only 96 species in the upstream region.

Downstream of the Pak Moon project, one or two species of fish have completely disappeared from the catch after dam construction. The decline has been higher in the upstream region, where out of the 149 species recognised in the present catch 51 species have been caught less significantly since the completion of the project. Out of the 51 species the dam has particularly impacted 17 species. As their migration route is blocked in the beginning of the rainy season, the head pond has inundated their spawning ground and the fish pass is not performing. Fish catch directly upstream of the dam has declined by 60-80% after the completion of the project.

Reservoir Stocking as MitigationReservoir fishery was developed by EGAT in response to claims of declining fish catch. Total cost of stocking the head pond with fresh water Prawn (Macrobrachium Rosenbergi) ranged between US$31,920 and US$44,240 annually between 1995-98. The department of Fisheries estimates the total annual revenue of fishing yield to range between 1.2 to 3.2 million baht. However, the estimated annual catch and revenue for fishermen are too high. The Department of Fisheries in their revenue estimate included the naturally occurring Macrobrachium species that can breed in fresh water. The M. Rosenbergi spawns in salt water and migrates to fresh water and therefore cannot establish a population under reservoir conditions. For this reason, it may well turn out that the stocking of M. Rosenbergi in Pak Moon head pond is not generating any income for the fishermen.

Impact on Livelihood

In the post-dam period fishing communities located upstream and downstream of the dam reported 50-100% decline in fish catch and the disappearance of many fish species. The number of households dependent on fisheries in the upstream region declined from 95.6% to 66.7%. Since the completion of the project several committees were set up to assess the number and extent of households affected by loss of fisheries income. Based on the committee's findings, Egat paid 90,000 baht to each of the 3,955 fishermen in 1995, and it approved payment of 60,000 baht each to another 2,200 fishermen in March 2000. A large number of households located upstream of the dam are still waiting to be recognised for compensation. Unexpected costs of the project included compensation for fisheries (488.5 million baht had been paid up to March 2000) and investment in fish and prawn stocking programmes. Till March 2000, 488.5 million baht (US$19.5 million) had been paid as compensation for loss of fisheries livelihood.

While the government acknowledged the impact on fisheries and agreed to compensate eligible households at the rate of 90,000 baht for loss of income during the three-year construction period, mitigation for the long-term loss of fisheries livelihood is under negotiation. Impact on RapidsMore than 50 natural rapids were permanently submerged by the project. These rapids served as the habitat of a number of species of fish. The implication of the loss of rapids for fisheries was not assessed in the project's environmental impact study.

Other Environmental impacts

The project has resulted in the loss of riverbank vegetation, natural forest and community forest. The women in the community harvested 40 edible plants, 10 bamboo species and 45 mushroom species for household subsistence and small income. A number of medicinal plants were also found near the Moon riverbank. Loss of these plants and vegetation through inundation has implications for biodiversity and household food security.

These aspects were overlooked in the environment assessment study for the project.

WHO GAINED, WHO LOST?

The Pak Moon project was a part of Egat's least cost development plan to serve the peaking needs of Northeast Thailand. However, as the project cannot function as a reliable peaking plant due to a number of constraints, the nature and extent of gain from the power contribution of the remains a matter of speculation. From the distribution by power producing types in overall generation since 1988, it is apparent that hydropower is gradually playing a less important role in power provision. When it is most needed, during the hottest and driest months, they are least likely to have the water resources to contribute.

Communities dependent on fisheries for their livelihood upstream and downstream of the Moon River experienced an ongoing decline in fish catch for which the government has already paid a considerable amount of compensation. But while compensation settlement has been reached with a large number of households for loss in income during the three years of construction, compensation for permanent loss of livelihood are still under negotiation. Furthermore, permanent loss of fisheries cannot be replaced by a one-off cash compensation and the Thai Government is left vulnerable to ever-increasing claims.

Regarding the issue of fisheries, all stakeholders stand to lose, not only from a disrupted ecosystem but also from increased expenditure and unsuccessful mitigation efforts.

The projected prosperity after the dam completion has never materialised. Villagers who owned land on slightly higher elevations are able to grow rice as prior to the dam construction. But villagers who were dependent largely on fisheries for cash income have found no viable alternative means of living. Along the Moon River, swamps and wetland forests are parts of the riverine ecosystem. During the rainy season, these are flooding areas and places for fish to spawn. In the past, villagers used the area along the river to find bamboo shoots, mushrooms, native plants and vegetables that they depend on for their subsistence. During the dry season, they also developed narrow patches of land along the riverbanks for growing vegetables. In the upper part of the lower Moon, where banks were not steep, land along the river was developed as paddy fields. All this is now gone.

As their food and income security has been destabilised, villagers have sought different ways to cope with the changing conditions. Some have left their villages to look for alternative employment. Compensation was not invested in productive assets. Many affected people used the money to build a new house. Many sold their cattle in order to have cash in hand. Many also have debts after borrowing from their cooperatives and local moneylenders.

In other words, short term wage opportunities and one off cash compensation cannot replace the loss of a productive resource base for the community.

SOCIAL COLLAPSE

After resettlement, villagers have witnessed many social and cultural problems. The new social arrangements have disrupted former social relations and changed patterns of interaction among the villagers. Before the dam the Mun river served as the stage for their social life.

Villagers met, interacted, developed social networks of exchange, and helped each other. After the dam, the traditional communal ceremony usually organised on the riverbank could not be held due to the submergence of the ceremonial site and, in part, due to the social disintegration of the communities.

Since the beginning of the Pak Moon project conflicts of ideas and interest arose between those who opposed the dam and the kamnan and headmen group.

The conflict was intensified during protests and demonstrations for compensation. Those who opposed the dam were often discriminated against so that the conflict over the dam created deep social rifts.

The local community and adversely affected villagers have expended considerable time and effort over nearly ten years in protests, demonstrations and negotiations with the government and project authorities. What became an issue of lost livelihood and a wrangle over compensation was initially a demand for a say in the decision making process as it affects their livelihoods. Given the lack of a satisfactory outcome from their point of view, the process has created tremendous bitterness.

 
 

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